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1 Introduction
Fisheries management is currently in transition from reliance on single-species management
principles to a more holistic approach that has been termed ecosystem-based fisheries man-
agement (EBFM).1 EBFM encourages policies that incorporate the complexities of marine
ecosystems, e.g., interactions among multiple fish species, spatial and temporal heterogeneity,
chemical and biological processes, multiple ecosystems services. Application of the EBFM
paradigm has tackled complexity in coupled ecological-economic marine ecosystems with the
help of quantitative computer-based models that due to abundance computing power are capa-
ble of tracking a virtually unbounded number of sentient and non-sentient ecosystem elements
at fine spatial and temporal scale.2 These models are used to simulate ecological and economic
outcomes of management interest (e.g., spatial-temporal fishing mortality, rent generation)
under alternate model parameterizations and competing management scenarios in a process
called management strategy evaluation.3
To date, policy designs that follow the EBFM approach (i) assume simplistic multiple-
species harvest technologies that rule out crucial elements of commercial fishing, (ii) assume
ad-hoc, myopic rules for commercial fishing behavior, and (iii) misspecify management regu-
lations. These naive assumptions and miss-specifications invalidate the management strategy
evaluation process as it is currently practiced. This paper introduces a model and a solution
approach to remedy this problem.
The central focus of our paper is the spatial-temporal evolution of the marine ecosystem
under a decentralized production environment. Our motivation is the following. In practice, a
fishery regulator sets quotas after observing the initial state of the ecosystem, i.e., the spatial
distribution of the multiple-species fish stock, market demand for fish, factor input prices,
and the technology available to the commercial sector. The regulator however controls the
seasonal quota only. A particular quota choice initiates a transition to an end-of-season state
of the ecosystem that is jointly determined by natural ecological forces and equilibrium fishing
mortality. To meet long term, i.e., intra-seasonal, management goals, the regulation must
understand the mapping from initial conditions and a particular quota, the end-of-season
outcome. This paper provides this mapping.
We consider a spatially heterogeneous, multiple-species (commercial) fishery that is man-
aged with an individual transferable quota (ITQ) regulation. Following Singh and Weninger
1EBFM is described in Patrick and Link (2015) as one that “Recognizes the combined physical, biological,
economic and social tradeoffs for managing the fisheries sector as an integrated system, specifically addresses
competing objectives and cumulative impacts to optimize the yields of all fisheries in an ecosystem.”
2The Atlantis ecosystem model (Fulton et al., 2007) is a computer-based “simulation modeling approach
for marine ecosystems that includes oceanographic, chemical (nutrient cycling), ecological (competition and
predation), and anthropogenic processes in a three-dimensional, spatially explicit domain. Atlantis is intended
as a strategic management tool to evaluate hypotheses about ecosystem response, to understand cumulative
impacts of human activities, and to rank broad categories of management options.” Fishing behavior is assumed
to myopically respond to profit opportunities which are linked in ad hoc ways to stock abundance and capital
costs. Bioeconomic models that exploit rational economic behavior under real world regulatory instruments
have not been developed.
3Prellezo, et al., 2009 review 13 bioeconomic models which have been developed primarily for evaluating
management of European fisheries. Plaga´nyi, 2007 reviews a larger number of models that seek to improve
EBFM. Lehuta et al., (2016) discuss complex systems models and management principles.
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(2009, 2015), we specify a dual model of the harvest technology that links factor input al-
locations (e.g., costs of vessel capital services, labor, fuel, bait) and multiple-species stock
abundance to multiple-species harvests. The technology we consider emphasizes the endoge-
nous but costly control that fishermen exhibit over the mix of species they harvest.4 Our model
links endogenous targeting to the absolute and relative abundance of the multiple-species fish
stock, a feature that is essential component of bioeconomic fisheries models.
In our model, the regulator announces species-specific seasonal quotas that cap the quantity
of fish that can be legally landed during a set regulatory cycle, viz., a fishing season. In order
to maximize seasonal private profit, fishermen trade quotas in markets, allocate factor inputs,
and harvest quotas across diverse regions and across multiple periods within a fishing season.
We derive the rational expectations equilibrium, which consists of endogenous quota trading
prices, spatial-temporal stock abundance, harvests, landings, and discards of multiple fish
species, capital deployment across fishery regions and across periods, and fishery rent under
the ITQ-regulation.5
The rational ecological-economic equilibrium outcomes we derive satisfy an equi-marginal
principle whereby the profit per unit of each species quota is equalized across space and within
the regulatory cycle. In equilibrium, there can be no quota rent hot spots. Equilibrium quota
prices effectively direct and concurrently determine spatial-temporal capital deployment, har-
vesting operations, and stock conditions. We study the equilibrium outcomes under (i) a range
of ecological conditions including regional stock heterogeneity in initial conditions as well as
their growth characteristics, (ii) landing price differentials across species and time periods, and
(iii) variations in the cost of capital across time within a season.
For a two-species fishery with a given stock and fish market conditions, the equi-marginal
principle across various regions allows us to partition a regionwise two-dimensional quota space,
which uniquely maps regional quotas to equilibrium harvest and landings and identifies the set
of implementable quotas that are fully landed without discards. A simple sum of these region-
wise implementable sets generates an aggregate fishery-wide set that foretells the regulator’s
feasible options. Together, these partitions facilitate an intuitive and insightful analysis of
our results that is a key novelty of our approach. This approach can be trivially extended to
any number of regions or periods. However, we believe that the results that highlight the key
inter-regional and inter-temporal margins are most simply achieved by limiting the analysis to
two regions and two subperiods. Therefore, for expositional simplicity, our results focus on a
two-species, two-region and two-subperiod fishery.
The results showcase the key spatial, temporal (within-season), and cross species connec-
tions that map fundamentals to outcomes of management interest. For example, a decrease in
the seasonal quota of a single fish species will in general affect harvests, landings, discards and
thus stock growth for all species in all regions of the fishery during all harvest periods. Similar
effects follow a change in any economic or ecological condition, irrespective of whether it is
limited to a particular region or applies fishery-wide, or whether it is temporary or holds for
4See Branch and Hilborn, 2008; Singh and Weninger, 2017; Weninger et al., 2018 for empirical evidence of
endogenous targeting in commercial fisheries.
5Berck and Perloff (1984) derive a rational expectations entry equilibrium in an open access fishery. Analytical
and computational challenges that arise under rational expectations assumptions may explain why few other
papers take this approach.
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the entire season. These contemporaneous and dynamic general equilibrium feedbacks operate
through (1) cost channels due to the joint technology, (2) ecological channels including own-
and cross-species-dependent stock growth effects and spatial fish migration, and (3) the trade
in quotas that links all spatial and within-season harvest operations.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. The first is its pragmatic necessity :
the model that we offer in this paper is an essential but currently unavailable component of
EBFM. The array of ecosystems models currently in use impose restrictive and empirically
unsupported assumptions on multiple-species fishing technologies. The Fleet and Fisheries
Forecast (F-cube) model, for example, assumes the mix of harvested species as fixed within
fleet me´tiers. Second, currently available models ignore regulatory and market constraints
that exist in managed fisheries: The regulatory instrument in popular EBFM models is the
quantity of fishing effort allocated by fishermen (see Pelletier, et. al., 2009; Ulrich et. al., 2012;
Marchal and Vermard, 2013). Third, these models rely on myopic, ad hoc rules for predicting
fishing behavior: Standard assumptions are that fishermen allocate effort across time and space
in response contemporaneous accounting profit opportunities, at rates that must be specified
by the model user. Finally, quota market equilibrium prices are ignored. These restrictive
technological assumptions, ad hoc behavioral rules, and missing quota prices can mislead the
management strategy evaluation process, with potentially serious negative consequences for
long term outcomes in managed fisheries.
Our second contribution is to a broader fisheries management literature. Studies of natural
spatial-temporal stock diffusion processes, e.g., Brock and Xepapadeas (2010); Costello and
Polasky, 2008; Sanchirico and Wilen (1999, 2001, 2005); Smith et. al., (2009), have featured
steady state analysis under either open access conditions, i.e., no assigned property rights to
the fishery resource, or under fully delineated rights, i.e., a sole owner who controls all aspects
of harvest activity.6 Property rights in real world fisheries lie between these two extreme:
ITQ regulations, as noted, grant harvest rights but do not specify where or when fish are
harvested.7 Our model combines multiple-species and spatial and temporal heterogeneity and
explicitly studies dynamic outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Combin-
ing multiple-species, space and time, increases the dimensionality and complexity of our model.
Operationalizing the no hot spot principle across multiple species, locations, and within-season
time steps is computationally challenging. Numerical methods are used to solve our model. We
present results for a representative regulatory cycle, under various initial ecological-economic
6Clark (1980) recognized early that first-best harvest outcomes are not generally replicated under an ITQ
regulation if a fishery has heterogeneous stock abundance. Costello and Deacon (2007) and Valcu and Weninger
(2013) characterize second-best management of a temporally heterogenous, single-species fishery with a time-
independent quota regulation. Sanchirico and Wilen (1999, 2001, 2005) examine implications of managing
spatially heterogenous (also single-species) fisheries under open access and input-control regulatory approaches.
Studies of multi-species, ITQ-regulated fishing under spatial and temporal stock heterogeneity have, to our
knowledge, not appeared in the literature.
7Clark (1980), Boyce (1996), Costello and Deacon (2007), Valcu and Weninger (2013), and others the in-
complete property right inherent in an ITQ regulation fosters a form of inefficiency where the spatial-temporal
distribution of individual species’ harvests deviate from their first-best counterparts. The equilibrium outcomes
we derive also differ from the first best. However, our focus is not on efficiency loss due to incomplete property
rights, but rather their implications for managing a multiple-species fishery with a quota regulation.
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conditions, and for varying seasonal quotas.8 Section 3 characterizes ecological-economic equi-
librium outcomes. The final section 4 summarizes our main findings and their implications for
EBFM and discusses directions for future research.
2 The Model
Consider a spatially heterogeneous, multiple species fishery. We use subscript s = 1, 2, . . . , S
to denote S distinct regions. There are i = 1, 2, . . . , I fish species. Regional heterogeneity
derives from variation in the marine habitat and therefore stock growth conditions and carrying
capacity, economic characteristics, e.g. distance to fishing ports and therefore costs of accessing
the resource, or both. A fishing region may support some or all species. We describe spatial-
temporal stock growth conditions in detail below.
The bulk of what follows will consider a single representative regulatory cycle or fishing
season. Much of the analysis is concerned with the spatial and within-season temporal distribu-
tion of harvesting activity. We therefore divided the single season of length T into subperiods,
indexed t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
The fishery is managed with species-specific individual transferable quotas (ITQs). A
regulator announces a quota vector denoted by Q0 ≡ {Qi0}Ii=1 that caps seasonal landings of
each species. We assume the regulation either permits or, due to unobserved at-sea fishing
operations, does not prevent at-sea discards. Quota is neither spatially- or subperiod-specific,
and therefore the regulator cannot control where or when within the season species i fish is
landed. Quotas are traded in frictionless markets, i.e., there are no trading transactions costs.
Fishermen have access to a common harvesting technology. Each active fisherman employs a
single unit of vessel capital which carries a subperiod capital opportunity cost, which we denote
ρs in regions s; capital costs are assumed constant within season. Variable costs depend on
quantities harvested and the absolute and relative abundance of the individual species stocks.
Stock abundance and species mix can vary across regions and subperiods and therefore so can
variable costs. The assumption of a common technology allows us to think of a representative
fishermen in region s. Harvest, landing, and discard choices are assumed identical for all
fishermen operating in the same region and also indexed with subscript s.
2.1 A constrained planning problem
If the fishery were owned by a single individual, harvests and landings across species, regions,
and subperiods would be chosen to maximize fishery rent for the whole season. While making
these choices, this sole owner understands that any subperiod’s fishing mortality will impact a
subsequent subperiod’s stock abundance. Additionally, the sole owner can also exercise market
power in the input and output markets. The only constraint it faces is that the season’s total
fish landings do not exceed its quotas. The sole owner’s choices, however, diverge from the
equilibrium quantities in an ITQ competitive equilibrium: While trade in quotas ensures that
fish are efficiently harvested and landed across regions and across subperiods such that the
value of a marginal quota is maximized, the fishermen trading in these markets know that their
8Note that we do not restrict our analysis to steady state conditions and therefore an infinite set of ecological,
economic and management scenarios could be considered.
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individual choices in any subperiod are not going to alter the stock conditions in subsequent
subperiods. In addition, the fishermen also take all prices as given.
It is in this light that an ITQ equilibrium can be replicated by a constrained planning
problem. Our fictitious planner is constrained to take aggregate stock conditions, factor input
prices, and the consumer demand for fish as given, in the sense that the planner assumes
these variables are not influenced by her choices. However, when it comes to quota utilization,
the planner allocates quota across space and within-season subperiods in the most value-
and cost-efficient manner. We emphasize that the constrained planner construct is intended
to replicate the competitive equilibrium in the decentralized fishery production environment.
Posing the problem in this way simplifies the derivation and presentation of necessary and
sufficient equilibrium conditions.
The planner’s optimal within-season choices comprise (a) how much of the seasonal quota
of various species to utilize across subperiods and regions, (b) the number of vessel capital
to employ across subperiods and regions, and (c) the harvest, discard and landing vectors for
each unit of capital/vessel (in each region and subperiod).9
Note that each unit of vessel capital deployed in the planning problem mirrors the entry
of an individual fisherman and per vessel harvest, landing, and discard quantities correspond
to the choices of this fisherman in a decentralized ITQ equilibrium. Hereafter, vessels and
fishermen will be used synonymously. In what follows, we use small case letters to describe
individual fishermen’s variables and capital letters to describe aggregate variables. Let hist,
list and dist denote non-negative harvests, landings, and discards of species i fish for a repre-
sentative fishermen in region s and subperiod t. Note that dist = hist − list. We use Nst to
denote the units of capital deployed in region s, subperiod t and ρst to denote the capital cost.
Let pist denote the market price of species i landings in region s, subperiod t. The I-
dimension vectors of harvests, landings, discards and prices are denoted hst, lst, dst, and pst
respectively. We allow for the case where the landings price depends on its own as well as
its substitute species’ aggregate landings/supply; Lst ≡ {List}Ii=1. We will also for simplicity
consider the case where the landings price is fixed. This dependence is made explicit as needed
for clarification.
2.2 Fishing technology
Models of commercial fishing technologies are rooted in early work by Gordon (1954) and
Schaefer (1954) (see Hannesson (1983) for a review). The standard Gordon-Schaefer (G-S)
model posits harvest as linear in the fishing effort, a proxy for the composite of fixed and
variable inputs involved in the harvesting process. Two multi-species extensions of G-S model
commonly used in the fisheries literature lie on the extremes. In the first, e.g., Flaaten (1991),
each species’ harvest is independent of the harvests and this inputs allocated to other species.
This non-jointness assumption overlooks the pervasive feature of commercial fisheries in which
multiple fish species are concurrently intercepted by the nets, baited hook and other gears.10
9Notice that the harvest-mix chosen may include individual species’ harvests that exceed permissible seasonal
landings. Such overages must be discarded to comply with the regulation. The constrained planner does not
care about this waste given her assumed goal of maximizing seasonal profit given quota Q0.
10The fisheries management literature uses the term mixed fisheries to described the joint production of
multiple fish species (see Ulrich et al., 2012 and reference therein).
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In the second, a common harvest technology yields multiple species in fixed proportions.11
The properties of nonjointness and fixed output proportions have been tested and rejected
using empirical data (e.g., Squires 1987a, 1987b, 1988; Branch and Hilborn, 2008; Singh and
Weninger 2017; Weninger et al., 2018). Bycatch and discarding cannot occur a non-joint
technology or under a technology that exhibit free output disposability (Turner, 1995; Singh
and Weninger, 2009). Fixed output proportions rules out endogenous targeting of individual
species. Neither assumption is adequate for understanding multiple-species fishing behavior.
Following Singh and Weninger (2009), we specify below a dual, multiple-species technology
that is joint-in-inputs, exhibits the property of weak output disposability, and explicitly in-
corporates multiple-species stock abundance.12 We assume costs attain a minimum when the
mix of harvested species aligns with the mix of stocks in the region and subperiod of fishing.
A two species example motivates this property. Suppose region and subperiod (s, t) stock of
species 1 is more abundant than species 2. It should then be less costly to harvest a relatively
higher quantity of species 1 than, say, equal amounts of both species. The cost savings arise
because by targeting a mix that mirrors the relative stock abundance, costly searching and/or
gear and bait modifications that may otherwise be required to intercept additional species 2 or
avoid the more abundant species 1 are saved. Note also that if the regulator sets quotas that
do not match their relative stock abundance, e.g., suppose the quota for species 1 is relatively
small despite its relative abundant stock, the marginal cost of harvesting species 1, evaluated
at the regulated quota mix, could be negative. In this scenario, increasing species’ 1 harvest
beyond its quota level and discarding the excess catch may actually lower costs since costly
actions to avoid species 1 will not be required (see Singh and Weninger (2009) for additional
discussion and Singh and Weninger (2017) for empirical evidence).
11The F-cube model (Ulrich et al., 2008, 2009) assumes the fishing mortality exerted on a specific fish stock
by a fleet me´tier (e.g., a common vessel type and size, gear type, fishing area, time of the year) is proportional
to the effort exerted. The implied technology exhibits fixed output proportions and satisfies the property of
input-output separability.
12Models of dual harvesting technologies appear in Smith (1968), Squires (1987), Kirkely and Strand (1988),
Weninger (1998), among others. Smith (1968) includes, as an argument of the cost function, a measure of total
capital allocated to the fishery. In this case, costs are assumed to be non-decreasing in total capital, reflecting
a potential externality where large number of vessels on the fishing ground can impede each other and raise the
cost of harvesting fish.
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A functional form that exhibits the stock-dependent costly targeting property is13,14
c (h, φ (X,H)) =
1 + I∑
j=1
γj
(
hj∑I
k=1 hk
− Xj∑I
k=1Xk
)2 I∑
j=1
φj (Xj , Hj)h
ν
j , (1)
where the function φ is non-increasing in abundance Xst, and non-decreasing in aggregate
harvest Hst.
15,16 We assume in addition that ν > 1 such that variable costs are increasing and
convex in the harvest of each species.
When γ ≥ 0 but finite, which we assume, the first bracketed term on the right-hand side
of (1) captures the targeting component of the technology. This term increases as the harvest
shares and stock shares diverge. Thus as the fisherman targets a harvest share vector that
differs from the mix of stocks in the sea, harvesting costs rise.
Observe that if γ = 0 the first right-hand term in (1) takes the value of unity for all h;
harvest costs then are given by the second additively separable term
∑I
j=1 φ
j (Xj , Hj)h
ν
j . Thus
when γ = 0 the technology is non-joint and species-specific cost (and harvest) functions exist.
Alternatively when γ →∞, the first term in (1) is infinite whenever the species mix differs from
the stock abundance mix. When γ →∞ the technology exhibits fixed output proportions, i.e.,
adjusting the species mix away from from the stock abundance mix (endogenous targeting)
is infinitely costly. Implications of extreme technological assumptions are discussed in section
3.1.
13An alternative specification is
c (h, φ (X,H)) =
I∑
j=1
(
1 + γ
(
hj∑I
k=1 hk
− Xj∑I
k=1Xk
)2)
φj (Xj , Hj)h
ν
j ,
For the special case I = 2 both specifications are equivalent.
14Note that
h1
h1 + h2
− X1
X1 +X2
=
h2
h1 + h2
− X2
X1 +X2
.
Hence targeting costs are symmetric across the two species. This need not be the case in general. See Singh
and Weninger (2009) for a detailed discussion of the cost function for more than two species and asymmetric
targeting costs.
15Discrete time models of fisheries exploitation are complicated by the fact that stock growth is a continuous
process, while an ITQ regulation specifies seasonal landings limits. Our model strikes a compromise between
notational simplicity and accuracy. For example, if there is no within subperiod stock growth, which we assume
to be the case, per vessel variable costs may be more accurately defined as,
c(hj , Xj) =
∫ hj
0
c(z,Xj −Njz)dz,
where Xj is the beginning subperiod stock abundance and z is a variable of integration. Smith (1968) and
others consider the possibility that variable harvesting costs depend also on the quantity of capital deployed,
i.e., φ = φ (Xj , Hj , Nj) with ∂φ(·)/∂Nj > 0. An extension of the model to consider capital congestion effects is
reserved for future work.
16The function φ may be region specific. The results we present are qualitative and they remain unaltered
under this modification. For brevity, however, we abstract from this particular form of heterogeneity in this
paper.
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2.3 A recursive equilibrium
The constrained planning objective is to maximize seasonal profit by choosing a cross-regional
and within-season sequence of vessel capital deployment, harvests, landings, and discards for
each representative vessel: {Nst, {list, dist}i}st. The problem can be described as
max
{Nst,{list,dist}i}st
T∑
t=1
S∑
s=1
Nst
pst · lst − c
 hst︸︷︷︸
≡lst+dst
, φ (Xst, Hst)
− ρst

To ensure an efficient allocation of quota across space and time, the planner internalizes
the laws of motion for all species-specific quotas and subperiods t to t+ 1:
Qit+1 = Qit −
S∑
s=1
List = Qit −
S∑
s=1
Nstlist for all i, (2)
where the second equality follows from
S∑
s=1
List =
S∑
s=1
Nstlist. To solve this problem, the planner
must know the sequence of stock abundance across space and time.
It is assumed that the stock abundance of any species in any region in subperiod t + 1
potentially depends on the escapements of all species across all the regions. Formally, the
stock vector across all species and regions follows
Xt+1 = Γ (Et) (3)
where Eist = Xist−Hist.17 To illustrate, let there be two species (1 and 2) and two regions (1
and 2). A simple specification is:
X11t+1 = E11,t + r11E11t(1− E11t
K11
− α11E21t) + κ11
(
E12t
K12
− E11t
K11
)
)
; (4)
r11 is an own-stock growth/recruitment parameter; α11 captures cross-species competition (if
positive) or predation (if negative) on species 1 by species 2 in region 1; κ11 captures net
regional migration of species 1, and Kij is species and region-specific stock carrying capacity.
We now impose the idea of a rational expectations equilibrium to solve the constrained
planning problem. Such an equilibrium requires that the sequence of stock abundance be
consistent with the aggregate harvest choices. Since Hist = Nsthist is the aggregate harvest
of species i in region s in subperiod t, it follows that Eist = Xist − Nsthist. The equilibrium
then requires that abundance Xt+1 be consistent with the growth specification (4) and the
constrained planner’s harvest choices. Under this equilibrium construct, the regional and
temporal sequence of harvests, landings, and discards can be solved for since the problem is
fully specified.
It is easier to approach this problem as a dynamic program. Let ′ denote next subperiod
17This specification assumes that all discarded fish die. Escapement can be specified alternatively as Eist =
Xist − List − ωiDist, where ωi denotes the species i survival rate for discarded fish.
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variables. The state vector includes current quota holdings and stock abundance: {Q,X}. The
Bellman equation for the dynamic program is:
Vτ
({Qi}i , {{Xis}i}s) = max{Ns,lis,dis}

S∑
s=1
Ns (ps · ls − c (hs, φ (Xs, Hs)))
−
S∑
s=1
Nsρs + Vτ+1
({Q′i}i ,{{X ′is}i}s)
 (5)
subject to,
0 ≤ Q′i =Qi −
S∑
s=1
Nslis; (6a)
X ′ =Γ(E) (6b)
Let the current state be denoted as Y ≡ {Q,X}. A recursive equilibrium consists of a set
of landings, lτ (Y ) ≡ {{lisτ (Y )}i}s, discards, dτ (Y ) ≡ {{disτ (Y )}i}s (which imply harvests
hτ (Y ) = lτ (Y ) + dτ (Y )), vessel deployments, Nτ ≡ {Nsτ}s, landings prices, p (L (Y )), and
law of motion for X ′τ (Y ) for τ = 1, ..., T − 1 such that
1. Given X ′τ (Y ) and p (L (Y )), lτ (Y ) , dτ (Y ), Nτ (Y ) for τ = 1, ..., T solve the dynamic
program (5) subject to (6a) and (6b).
2. Aggregate laws of motion are consistent with policy functions:
(a) Lτ ≡ Nτ · lτ , Hτ = Nτ · hτ ,
(b) Q′τ (Y ) = Qτ − Lτ (Y ),
(c) X ′τ (Y ) = Γ (Xτ −Hτ (Y )), for τ = 1, ..., T .
Characterizing the equilibrium
The Kuhn-Tucker necessary condition for the region s optimal capital allocation Ns is,
ps · ls − c(hs, φ(Xs, Hs))− ρs −
∑
i
∂Vτ+1
({Q′i}i ,{{X ′is}i}s)
∂Q′i
· lis ≤ 0. (7)
If Ns > 0 equation (7) holds with equality.
The necessary condition for species i and region s landings is,
pis − chis(hs, φ(Xs, Hs))−
∂Vτ+1
({Q′i}i ,{{X ′is}i}s)
∂Q′i
≤ 0, for i = 1, ..., I, (8)
where chis(·) denotes partial differentiation with respect to the subscripted argument. If lis > 0
equation (8) holds with equality.
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Letting λi denote the multiplier on the quota constraint for species i, the optimal choice for
the quota to be landed in the current period and that to be carried forward, i.e., Q′i obtains:
∂Vτ+1
({Q′i}i ,{{X ′is}i}s)
∂Q′i
= λi. (9)
This condition states that the current species i quota shadow price is equal to its marginal
value if carried forward. An application of the Envelope theorem for current Qi obtains
∂Vτ
({Qi}i , {{Xis}i}s)
∂Qi
=
∂Vτ+1
({Q′i}i ,{{X ′is}i}s)
∂Q′i
= λi. (10)
This condition implies that an optimal intertemporal quota allocation equates its marginal
value in every period. Otherwise, the seasonal profit can be increased by allocating quotas to-
wards subperiods in which its marginal value is higher. Note that in a decentralized equilibrium
λi will be equal to the equilibrium market (lease) price for a unit species i quota.
Combining the preceding three equations we have for all τ ≤ T and s = 1, ..., S:
pis − chis (hs, φ (Xs, Hs))− λi ≤ 0. (11)
If lis > 0 equation (11) holds with equality. This is a standard result equating the marginal
net profit from a unit of quota to its shadow price.18 What is worth noting though is that the
condition holds for all species in all regions and within-season subperiods.
Equation (11) affirms that marginal revenue obtains from landings whereas marginal costs
depend on harvested quantities. Since landings can not exceed harvests, and discards are
nonnegative, optimal discards are characterized by
−chis (hs, φ (Xs, Hs)) ≤ 0. (12)
If dis > 0, equation (12) hold with equality. The condition for optimal discards can be stated
alternatively as, dischis = 0.
Notice that if chis < 0, costs can be lowered by harvesting more species i fish; variable profits
rise even if the extra catch is discarded at sea. Also, since pis ≥ 0 for all i for non-binding
quotas, λi = 0, condition (11) becomes,
pis − chis (hs, φ (Xs, Hs)) = 0; dis = 0. (13)
This condition states simply that since harvest can be landed to earn positive revenues, there
are no discards when the aggregate quota is slack.
Finally, combining (10) and (9) with (7) yields
ps · ls − c (hs, φ (Xs, Hs))−
∑
i
λilis︸ ︷︷ ︸
pis
≤ ρs. (14)
18It is also possible that despite quota being available harvesting of a species at a particular location is
prohibitively expensive; lis = 0 in all such cases.
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If Ns > 0 equation (14) holds with equality.
Equation (14) is a capital entry/exit condition in a decentralized ITQ fishery: variable
profit or capital quasi-capital rent in our case, net of quota rent, pis, must equal the capital
cost. If pis > ρs, capital continues to enter until pis = ρs. No capital enters, or all of it exits,
in a region s if pis < ρs.
Solving the constrained planner’s problem
The recursive equilibrium is obtained as the solution to S · T optimal capital conditions from
equation (7), I ·S ·T conditions on optimal landings from equation (8), and I ·S ·T conditions
for optimal discards from equation (12). In addition there are I quota constraint conditions.
These equations, along with the equilibrium consistency requirements described in section
(2.3), solve for (i) 2 · I · S · T harvest and landing choices, (ii) S · T capital deployments, and
(iii) I quota shadow prices.
In the simple case with I = S = T = 2 there are 8 harvest and landings choices, 4 capital
deployment choices, and 2 quota prices that must be determined. Interactions between the
many variables are complex. In the next sections we derive additional insights under some
special cases to illustrate implications of the model for fisheries management.
Intensive and extensive cost margins
Consider a region s in which Ns > 0. From (12), it follows that either his = lis > 0 or
chis (hs, φ (Xs, Hs)) = 0. Then, (11) implies
ps · ls − λ · ls = hs · chs .
Since Ns > 0, the capital quantity necessary condition, (14), obtains;
hs · chs = c (hs, φ (Xs, Hs)) + ρs,
which essentially reflects an efficiency condition that a competitive equilibrium brings about
by linking the intensive and extensive margins. The right-hand side denotes the cost of an
extra vessel (extensive margin) that would harvest hs. The left-hand side denotes the cost of
additional hs by spreading it over existing vessels (intensive margin). This marginal condition
can be summarized as:
Proposition 1: Variable costs incurred by an active vessel is given by
c (hs, φ (Xs, Hs)) =
ρs
ν − 1 . (15)
Proof: In appendix 6 we show that hs · chs =
∑
i hischis (hs, φ (Xs, Hs)) = νc (hs, φ (Xs, Hs)).
At an optimum that follows (11) - (13), a fisherman’s sales revenue net of quota lease cost
equals hs · (p− λ) = hschs =
∑
i hischis . Since the targeting component of the cost function is
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homogeneous of degree zero, its contribution to
∑
i hischis is equal to zero. Only the direct (non-
targeting) marginal harvest costs matter for the total and net revenue contributions. Notice
that the direct component of the cost function has a common exponent ν on all individual
species’ harvests. Then, the harvest revenue net of variable costs is (ν − 1) times the latter.
Conditions for optimal capital entry/exit ensure that the net harvest profit is equal to the
capital cost.
Proposition 1 anchors the fishing costs for all subperiods in a fishing season. If the dockside
prices are common across regions and are constant within a season, (11) further commands
that the marginal costs of each species’ harvest chis be identical across regions and subpe-
riods. An interesting implication is that a fish species with a sufficiently low landing quota
may be discarded throughout the season if its stock conditions warrant discard. Despite the
harmonization of the total costs and each species’ marginal costs across time and regions, the
equilibrium still allows for cross-species harvest and stock variations across time and region,
as will be illustrated in the next section.
3 Results
This section reports equilibrium harvests, landings, discards, capital allocations, and rent
outcomes under varying economic and beginning-of-season ecological conditions and for varying
quotas. Note that an infinite number of initial conditions and quotas are possible, with each
leading potentially to different equilibrium outcomes. Given our space limitations we select
initial conditions and quotas that illustrate some critical aspects of the equilibrium outcomes
of the model.
To further simplify the presentation, we consider a two- species, two-region and two-
subperiod fishery example. Within a fishing season, quota utilizations across different subperi-
ods are facilitated through quota trade and carryovers. The quotas utilized within a subperiod
operate as if they are the quota constraints for that subperiod insofar as they must be consis-
tent with optimality conditions (11) - (13) and the capital allocation condition in Proposition
1. In effect, each subperiod can be studied independently by taking its initial stock conditions
and the remaining unfished quota as given. The full season equilibrium requirement is that
(i) the quota prices across all subperiods must be equal and (ii) the stock abundance in the
second subperiod must be consistent with the escapement growth and dispersion from the first
subperiod.
With I = 2,
hj∑2
k=1 hk
− Xj∑2
k=1Xk
is the same for both j. Hence, letting γ = γ1 = γ2, the cost
function (1) becomes
c (h, φ (X,H)) =
(
1 + γ
(
h1
h1 + h2
− X1
X1 +X2
)2)(
φ1 (X1, H1)h
ν
1 + φ
2 (X2, H2)h
ν
2
)
.
The results we present below are qualitative in nature. However, for graphical presenta-
tions, we rely on a specific parameterization of the model. Our benchmark case assumes a
symmetric ecology, i.e., common stock growth parameters across species, and common eco-
nomic conditions across species and regions, i.e., pis = p for all i, s. We specify the function φ
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as φs(Xs, Hs) =
ηsHs
Xs
where ηs > 0 is a fixed parameter. Parameter values for our benchmark
case are reported in table 1.
Cost and prices Stock growth
γ = 25 ris = r = 1
ν = 1.25 αis = α = 0.2
η = 2.5 β = 0.05
ρs = ρ = 0.15 κi = κ = 0.1
pis = p = 1 Kij = K= 0.08
Table 1: Benchmark model parameters.
After obtaining the steady state of our benchmark case for a season with T = 2, ecological
and economic heterogeneity across species, regions, and subperiods are introduced sequentially
and one at a time to highlight the critical predictions of our model. For both species, let x∗ and
Q∗ = H∗ denote the steady state stock abundance and quota that maximize the present value
of the fishery, under the parameters in table 1 over an infinite (seasonal) planning horizon. Let
N∗ denote the equilibrium capital employed in each region. Below we consider scenarios in
which initial stock abundance and/or seasonal quotas deviate from these steady state values.
3.1 Within-subperiod equilibrium
With the background above, we first examine how quota constraints map to endogenous
multiple-species fishing mortality within a single subperiod. To proceed, we first partition
the quota space into zones that (a) demarcate quota combinations for which landings con-
straints either bind or are slack and (b) demarcate quota combinations for which the harvest
of either of the species is discarded.
Figure 1 shows the eight quota zones that correspond to the constraints in equations (11)
and (12). Zones I-VIII in figure 1 show aggregate or fishery-wide outcomes. Quantities on
the axes are scaled as a percentage of the fishery value-maximizing steady state quota. Line
segments 0AA¯ and 0CC¯ delineate discard zones (Singh and Weninger, 2009). In zones I, II,
and III the species 1 quota exceeds the unconstrained optimal harvest of species 1, i.e., the
species 1 quota is slack. Zones III and IV contain quotas for which optimal harvests satisfy the
necessary condition ch2s(hs, φ(Xs, Hs)) = 0 with positive discards of species 2 fish. This occurs
because the species 2 quota in zones III and IV is relatively small, i.e., costs can be reduced by
harvesting in excess of Q2 and discarding the overage. In zone II discards are zero; while the
species 2 quota is relatively low in this zone, both species quotas are large (relative to quotas
in zones III and IV). For quota in zone II, it is profitable to harvest a mix of species that more
closely aligns with stock abundance and leave a portion of the species 1 quota unutilized, i.e.,
λ1 = 0 for Q ∈ zone II. For the same reasons (but with species numbers reversed), species 1
discards are positive for Q ∈ zones V and VI, and there are no discards when Q ∈ zone VII.
In zone VIII, both the quotas bind while neither species is discarded. Importantly, observe
that the diamond shaped zone VIII is the implementable harvest set identified in Singh and
Weninger (2009). The implication is that only in zone VIII is the mapping from quotas to
harvests, and landings with no discards, one-to-one.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium in an ITQ-Regulated Fishery. Quotas are denoted as a percentage
of steady state values. Zones I - VIII identify quota combinations {Q1, Q2} for which landings
constraints either bind or are slack and/or for which individual species harvests are either
retained or discarded at sea.
Figure 1 shows implementable sets under three scenarios for the beginning season stock
abundance. The innermost set demarcated by thick lines assumes that the fish stock is spa-
tially homogeneous with each region’s abundance equal to the steady state stocks, X∗ =
{{x∗, x∗} , {x∗, x∗}}. Hereafter, we refer to this stock abundance scenario as the spatially ho-
mogeneous fishery or SP-HOM for short. The outermost set, demarcated by a thin line, assumes
that regional stock abundance at the start of the season is, X = {{1.2x∗, 0.8x∗} , {0.8x∗, 1.2x∗}}.
In this case, region 1 is relatively more abundant in the species 1 stock while region 2 is sym-
metrically more abundant in species 2 stock; no region has an absolute abundance advantage
but each region has a comparative advantage in a particular species’ stock. Hereafter we will
refer to this stock scenario as the spatial comparative advantage fishery or SP-CA for short.
The implementable set demarcated with a dashed lines assumes initial regional stock abun-
dance quantities, X = {{1.2x∗, x∗} , {0.8x∗, x∗}}. In this scenario region 1 exhibits an absolute
abundance advantage. Also, both regions have a comparative advantage in one of the species
stocks but these magnitudes are smaller compared to the previous scenario. Below we refer to
this scenario as the spatially comparative and absolute abundance fishery, SP-CAA for short.
The reader will notice that while our stock abundance differ considerably, the fishery wide
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implementable sets in figure 1 almost converge. This is by construction: in each of the three
scenarios, aggregate abundance is {2x∗, 2x∗}. The regional differences become salient in the
respective regional partitions shown in figure 2 below.
It is worth reiterating that the equilibrium quota trading prices, λ1 and λ2 vary with the
quota set by the regulator, initial stock conditions, landings and factor input prices, and model
parameters, but are common across regions. Similarly, because dockside prices are assumed
common across regions, if either species’ harvest is discarded its quota price will equal to its
landings price, i.e., λi = pi, and there will be discards in both regions.
19 Since the equilibrium
quota prices are common across the whole fishery including all its regions, zones I-VIII of
the fishery wide quota partition uniquely map with similar zones in regional partitions, as
illustrated in figure 2.
Figure 2a corresponds to the SP-CA stock abundance scenario, with relatively high species
1 abundance and thus lower species-specific costs in region 1. As a result, quotas for which
the species 1 constraint is slack (zones II and III) and quotas for which species 2 is discarded
(zones III and IV) are relatively large. The situation is reversed in region 2 where species
2 is more abundant and less costly to harvest. Overall, the divergence between the regional
implementable sets highlights the assumed species-specific comparative advantages. Both sets
however cover the same area, which indicates that neither has an absolute stock advantage.
Figure 2b shows zonal demarcations corresponding to the SP-CAA abundance scenario;
a comparative advantage for species 1 in region 1, albeit diminished relative to the SP-CA
scenario. Observe regional sets that exhibit more overlap than in figure 2a. A larger area
0A1B1C1 in region 1 indicates its absolute stock size advantage.
We next present a complete characterization of harvest and discard behavior for quotas in
zones I-VIII from figure 1. Reference to the three stock scenarios support the discussion. To
ease notation and where no confusion can arise, this section adopts the notational convention
φs = φ(Xs, Hs).
Zone I: Neither species’ quota binds; no discards. For quotas set in zone I, λi = 0 for
i = 1, 2. Then, chis (h1s, h2s, φ
s) = pi for all i, s. These conditions along with Proposition 1
determine the unconstrained per vessel harvests {his} and number of vessels {Ns} within each
region. The unconstrained aggregate harvests at B in figure 1 obtain by simple addition of
harvest vectors corresponding to points B1 and B2 in figure 2. Correspondingly, any fishery-
wide quota that lies in zone I in figure 1 will, in equilibrium, map to points B1 and B2 in figure
2.
Zone II: Species’ 2 constraint binds; no discards. If a quota is set in zone II, λ1 = 0,
and λ2 > 0. In the absence of discards, λ2 < p2. Here, ch1s (h1s, h2s, φ
s) = p1 for s = 1, 2;
ch21
(
h11, h21, φ
1
)
= ch22
(
h12,
Q2−N1h21
N2
, φ2
)
= p2 − λ2 ∈ (0, p2). These conditions along with
proposition 1 obtain per vessel harvest vectors {his} and number of vessels {Ns} in each region.
A simple aggregation obtains total regional and fishery-wide harvest vectors. Each point
λ2 ∈ (0, p2) lies on the line segment B1C1 and B2C2 in figure 2. If the regionally allocated
19These arguments hold for any number of regions and species; assuming I = 2 facilitates a graphical repre-
sentation.
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(a) SP-CA: X = {{1.2x∗, 0.8x∗} , {0.8x∗, 1.2x∗}}
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(b) SP-CAA: X = {{1.2x∗, x∗} , {0.8x∗, x∗}}
Figure 2: Regional Equilibrium Outcomes. Harvests are denoted as a percentage of
the benchmark model steady state values. Stock abundance in panel (a) satisfies X =
{{1.2x∗, 0.8x∗} , {0.8x∗, 1.2x∗}}; abundance in (b) satisfies X = {{1.2x∗, x∗} , {0.8x∗, x∗}}.
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quotas of species 2 (read on y − axis) are at or above B1 and B2, they do not bind, i.e., λ2 = 0.
They bind below B1 and B2 and as they decrease further λ2 rises until λ2 = p2; points C1 and
C2 correspond to this pair of species 2 quotas. The line segment BC in figure 1 aggregates
these regional segments: for each λ2 ∈ (0, p2), there is a unique point on the three line segments
{B1C1, B2C2, BC}. Conversely, a point on BC can be uniquely mapped to points on regional
zonal boundaries. Thus, if a fishery wide quota lies in zone II, the total harvest and landing
of both species lies on the line segment BC and corresponding regional harvests lie on B1C1
and B2C2, with H21 +H22 = Q2. Obviously, Q1 > H11 +H12.
Quota point QII = {1.8Q∗, 1.2Q∗} in figure 1 falls in zone II. For the SP-CA stock scenario
(figure 2a), the two regional harvests are at point HII in the respective partitions.20
Zone III: Species’ 2 constraint binds; positive species 2 discards. For quotas set in
zone III we have λ1 = 0 and λ2 = p2. Here, ch1s (h1s, h2s, φ
s) = p1 for all s; ch21
(
h11, h21, φ
1
)
=
ch22
(
h12, h22, φ
2
)
= 0; Q2 < H21 + H22 = N1h21 + N2h22. These conditions along with
Proposition 1 obtain per vessel harvest vectors {his} and number of vessels {Ns} in each
region. Notice from the above conditions that in zone III, equilibrium harvest quantities are
independent of {Q1, Q2}.
Quota QIII = {1.5Q∗, 0.4Q∗} in figure 1 falls in zone III. For the SP-CAA stock scenario
(figure 2b), the two regional harvests and landings fall at points HIII and LIII in the respective
regional partitions. Species 2 discard occurs as a result. Notice that under SP-CAA, region 1
harvests a larger share of both species due to its larger stock.
Zone IV: Quotas of both species bind; positive species 2 discards. In zone IV,
λ1 ∈ (0, p1) and λ2 = p2. Here ch11
(
h11, h21, φ
1
)
= ch12
(
Q1−N1h11
N2
, h22, φ
2
)
= p1 − λ1 ∈
(0, p1) ; ch21
(
h11, h21, φ
1
)
= ch22
(
h12, h22, φ
2
)
= 0. Once again, these conditions along with
proposition 1 obtain per vessel harvest vectors {his} and vessel allocations {Ns} for region s.
A simple aggregation obtains fishery-wide harvest vectors. Each point λ1 ∈ (0, p1) lies on the
line segment 0C1 and 0C2, with λ1 = 0 at C1 and C2 and λ1 = p1 at 0 (figure 2). The line
segment 0C in figure 1 aggregates these two regional segments: for each λ1 ∈ (0, p1), there is
a unique point on the three line segments {0C1, 0C2, 0C}. Conversely, a point on 0C can be
uniquely mapped to the points on its regional counterparts.
Clearly, if the fishery-wide quota lies in zone IV, i.e., the total harvest of both species lies
at its vertical projection on the line segment 0C. The corresponding regional harvests lie on
0C1 and 0C2, with H11 +H12 = Q1 while Q2 = L21 + L22 < H21 +H22.
Quota point QIV = {1.5Q∗, 0.4Q∗} in figure 1 falls in zone IV. For the SP-CAA stock
scenario (figure 2b), the two regional harvests and landings are at points HIV and LIV in the
respective regional partitions. Species 2 discard occurs as a result. Unlike zone III, the quota
of species 1 is now fully utilized.
Zone V, VI, and VII Equilibrium outcomes in zones V, VI, and VII mirror those in zones
IV, III, and II respectively, with species’ quotas and stocks reversed. We do not repeat the
results to conserve space.
20LII = HII , though not shown in the figure to avoid clutter.
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Zone VIII: Both species’ quotas bind: no discards. In zone VIII, quota shadow prices
satisfy λi ∈ (0, pi). Here ch11
(
h11, h21, φ
1
)
= ch12
(
Q1−N1h11
N2
, h22, φ
2
)
= p1 − λ1 ∈ (0, p1);
ch21
(
h11, h21, φ
1
)
= ch22
(
h12,
Q2−N1h21
N2
, φ2 (X2, H2)
)
= p2 − λ2 ∈ (0, p2).
Quota point QV III = {0.75Q∗, 0.75Q∗} in figure 1 falls in zone VIII. For the SP-CA stock
scenario (figure 2a), the two regional harvests are at points HV III inside the implementable
sets of respective regional partitions. Both species quotas are fully utilized with no discards:
LV III = HV III .
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Capital Allocation. Horizontal (vertical) axes denote capi-
tal allocations as a % of N∗ in regions 1 (2). The solid line OB represents SP-HOM
with X = {{x∗, x∗} , {x∗, x∗}} and p1 = p2 = 1. The set OABC corresponds to
SP-CAA with X = {{1.2x∗, x∗} , {x∗, 1.2x∗}} and p1 = p2 = 1; OA′B′C ′ corresponds
to X = {{1.2x∗, x∗} , {0.8x∗, x∗}} and p1 = p2 = 1; OA′′B′′C ′′ corresponds to X =
{{1.2x∗, x∗} , {x∗, 1.2x∗}}, p1 = 1.5, and p2 = 1.
Equilibrium capital allocations corresponding to quota zones in figures 1 and 2 are shown in
figure 3: the allocation set demarcated by OABC corresponds to the SP-CA stock abundance
while OA′B′C ′ corresponds to SP-CAA abundance.
When regions are ecologically and economically symmetric, equilibrium capital will also be
symmetric. The solid line OB in figure 3 conforms to this case.
Consider the SP-CA abundance scenario, i.e., neither region has an absolute advantage.
The set OABC indicates that a higher quota of species 1 (2) attracts more capital in region
1 (2) in equilibrium. For quotas QII and QV III in figure 1 and SP-CA stock conditions, the
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equilibrium capital allocations are indicated at points II and VIII, respectively. On the other
hand, for the SP-CAA stock abundance scenario, the set OA′B′C ′ in figure 3 shows that more
capital is allocated to region 1. For QIII and QIV from figure 1, equilibrium capital occurs at
points III and IV, respectively, in figure 3.
Non-joint and fixed output proportions technology
Recall that the results in figure 1 assume a technology that is joint-in-inputs with positive
targeting costs. We next consider how the harvest mapping changes under the technological
assumptions that dominate the multiple-species fisheries literature.
When the technology is non joint in inputs individual species harvests are independent and
there is no longer any motive to discard fish. Since each species are independently harvested,
whether their quota binds or not is independent of the quota of the other. Refer once again
to figure 1. As γ → 0 segment 0C rotates clockwise toward the horizontal axis causing discard
zone III and IV to vanish. Simultaneously, segment 0A rotates counterclockwise toward the
vertical axis, eliminating discard zone V and VI. The no-discard zone VIII takes a rectangular
shape with width (height) that is determined by the value of Q1 (Q2) at which the marginal
profit from harvesting additional species 1 (2) fish falls to zero.
Next consider a fixed output proportions technology. When γ →∞, i.e., harvest occurs in
fixed proportions, no-discard zone VIII collapses to a ray. Any quota that does not lie on this
ray entails discard of one of the species, unless none of the quotas bind. Therefore, only zones
I, IV, and V exist.
As we have argued, the harvesting technology is more realistically represented by an in-
termediate value of γ. A counterfactual assumption on the harvest technology will lead to
flawed predictions. Suppose, for example, a quota pair chosen by the regulator falls within the
implementable set under a non-joint technology, but lies outside the implementable set of a
realistically proximate joint technology. The harvest and landing predictions under the former
will be very different than that expected under the latter. The prediction of subsequent stock
abundance will also diverge. Over multiple subperiods in a season, these errors can be further
amplified.
A technology misspecification can be equally detrimental from a regulatory perspective. A
non-joint technology offers an expanded implementable set and rules out discards completely,
whereas the implementable set under fixed proportions is fully restricted to lie on a ray: the
former offers maximum flexibility for setting regulatory quotas, whereas the latter offers none.
Under a non-jointness assumption, the quotas optimally chosen by a regulator may lead to
unintended discards. Under a fixed-proportions assumption, a regulator fearful of discards
may opt for overly restrictive quotas.
Landings prices
We next consider the role of landings prices in the mapping from quota regulations to equilib-
rium outcomes. For this exercise we assume p1 = 1.5 and p2 = 1. The initial stock conditions
are set to the SP-CA scenario. All other parameters are unchanged. Figure 4 contrasts changes
in harvest/discard outcomes relative to the symmetric price case studied above.
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(b) Regional equilibrium.
Figure 4: Equilibrium Harvests and Landings Prices. Figure shows the impact of a 50 %
increase in the landing price of species 1 fish, relative to the baseline parameters. Quotas and
Harvests are reported as percentage of benchmark model steady state values. Stock conditions
follow the SP-CA scenario with X = {{1.2x∗, 0.8x∗} , {0.8x∗, 1.2x∗}}.
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There are four notable effects of an increase in the price of species 1 landings. First, the
set of quotas for which the species 1 quota is slack, i.e., zones II and III is now smaller.
Second, and vice versa, zones VI and VII, i.e., cases where the species 2 quota is slack become
larger. These changes result from the increased profitability of species 1 which, under a joint
technology, increases the quantity of both species for which variable profits offset capital costs.
The discard set of species 2, the area under 0C ′C ′ is enlarged, while the discard set for
species 1, 0A′A′ shrinks. Changes in regional zonal partitions (figure 4b) mimic fishery-wide
changes (figure 4a) closely. Region 1, with higher relative abundance of the now higher price
species 1 spans a larger portion of quota space, some of which was unutilized under the lower
benchmark price.
It is evident that the set of quotas in zones IV and V falling under line segments 0C and
0A′, respectively, are invariant to a change in the price of species 1 fish. Recall that both
quotas bind along these segments. For one species, harvest equals quota, whereas for the other
(over-quota) species, marginal harvest cost is equal to zero. A change in fish price of species 1
only raises its quota price for quotas set in zones IV and V.21
We note that a rise in the price of species 1 increases capital quasi rent particularly in
region 1 where its stock is relatively abundant. The set OA′′B′′C ′′ in figure 3 illustrates the
resultant shift in equilibrium capital.
3.2 Equilibrium across regions and subperiods
In this section we characterize equilibrium spatial and temporal harvests, landings, discards,
and quota utilization. With multiple subperiods temporal quota utilization is endogenous and
satisfies the temporal arbitrage condition in equation (10). In the two region case, the quota
market clearing equation becomes,
2∑
t=1
(L1it + L2it) =
2∑
t=1
(N1tl1t +N2tl2it) ≤ Qi, i = 1, 2.
It is worth reiterating that given dockside fish prices and quota prices, equations (11) -
(13) along with proposition 1 continue to determine equilibrium harvests and landings. With
S = T = 2, the quota market clears across the two regions and the two subperiods.
A second difference is that stock abundance across multiple subperiods is endogenously
determined, simultaneously with spatial, within-season and species-specific harvests. A perfect
foresight equilibrium requires the dynamic evolution of stock, given by Xt+1 = Γ (Xt −Ht),
to be consistent with the spatial-temporal harvest profile. In equilibrium, fishermen rationally
forecast harvests and accompanying stock conditions for all s, t.22 Appendix 7 provides a fixed
point algorithm to solve for the equilibrium by using a computer.
21It is easily checked that p1 − λ1 remains constant on the segment 0C when p1 changes from 1 to 1.5 and
the segment extends up to 0C′. With p1 = 1, λ1 = 0 at C, but with p1 = 1.5, λ1 = 0 at C′. It must be the case
that λ1 = 0.5 at C so that p1 − λ1 = 1 remains as before at C.
22In the model, it is perfect foresight that allows fishermen to correctly forecast future stocks. Under uncer-
tainty, a rational expectations equilibrium requires that fishermen utilize publicly known stochastic distributions
of the model’s random variables to form their stock forecasts.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium under multiple-subperiods. Harvests and landings are the per-
centage of benchmark model steady state values. Panel (a) assumes stock abundance at 70%
of SP-HOM values ({0.7x∗, 0.7x∗, 0.7x∗, 0.7x∗}), quota {Q∗, Q∗}; panel (b) assumes initial
abundance, {1.2x∗, 0.8x∗, 1.2x∗, 0.8x∗}, quota {1.8Q∗, 1.4Q∗}; panel (c) assumes initial abun-
dance {1.2x∗, 0.8x∗, 1.2x∗, 0.8x∗}, quota {1.6Q∗, 1.6Q∗}; panel (d) abundance SP-CA, quota
{2Q∗, Q∗}. Subperiods are denoted t = 1, 2.
In this setting, the shape and location of quota zones discussed above and the implementable
harvest sets evolve as stock conditions change throughout the season. We next present equi-
librium outcomes under alternate management scenarios to further characterize equilibrium
outcomes of management interest.
Stock growth
Figure 5 shows equilibrium harvests and landings under varying stock conditions and quotas.
In each case, t = 1, 2 indexes subperiods within the season. Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c focus
on temporal effects in a fishery with spatially homogenous stock abundance at the beginning
of the season. Figure 5d shows a case of heterogenous regional abundance at the beginning
of season. The quota regulations vary to illustrate important properties of the equilibrium
outcomes. Specifics are presented below.
Following the notation of the previous section, x∗ and Q∗ denotes species-specific, steady
state stocks and optimal subperiod quotas for our baseline fishery. With T = 2, the seasonal
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quota is 2Q∗ for each species. The results in figure 5a show fishery-wide outcomes for a
regionally homogeneous fishery (effectively a single-region fishery) under a tight seasonal quota.
The scenario in figure 5a assumes beginning season stocks equal to {0.7x∗, 0.7x∗, 0.7x∗, 0.7x∗},
i.e., 70% of the SP-HOM stock scenario above. Seasonal quota is assumed set at {Q∗, Q∗}, i.e.,
50% of its steady state value. This scenario may represent the case of an low quota chosen to
protect an overfished stock.
As evident in figure 5a, equilibrium harvest in the first subperiod is less than the in the
second subperiod. The equilibrium foresees the growth of both species and thus the lower
harvesting costs at t = 2. Equilibrium capital and harvest per vessel at t = 1 and t = 2
increase over time while the equilibrium quota price remains constant throughout the season.
Note also that the zones that characterize fishing behavior expand reflecting within-season
stock growth.
The results in figure 5b consider a scenario with beginning season stocks that deviate from
their steady state levels but remain homogeneously distributed across space. Initial abundance
follows {1.2x∗, 0.8x∗, 1.2x∗, 0.8x∗}; the species 1 stock is 20% above its steady state value while
the species 2 stock is 20 % below its steady state value. We assume quotas to be {1.8Q∗, 1.4Q∗}
that mirror their relative stock abundance.
Figure 5b illustrates how the relative stocks of the two species and their harvests evolve
within the season. Note first that the t = 1 implementable harvest set tilts toward the more
abundant species 1 stock. The ITQ equilibrium induces a lower harvest of less-abundant species
2, and a higher harvest of more-abundant species 1. Escapement at t = 1 and stock growth
between subperiods aligns the two stocks toward their common steady state value as is evident
from the rotation of the implementable set in t = 2 counterclockwise toward species 2. At
t = 2, the species 2 harvest increases while the species 1 harvest falls relative to their t = 1
values.
Species-specific quotas either bind or are slack at the seasonal level. Figure 5c assumes ini-
tial stock abundance, {1.2x∗, 0.8x∗, 1.2x∗, 0.8x∗}, but with quotas set equally at {1.6Q∗, 1.6Q∗}.
This scenario features a stock-quota mismatch whereby the regulator has issued excess species
2 quota. In figure 5c, the species 2 quota is slack throughout the season. Equilibrium harvests
in both subperiods equates the landing price to the marginal cost of are species 2 harvests,
since with a slack seasonal quota λ2 = 0. As in the scenario shown in figure 5b, low species 2
harvests at t = 1 allows for species 2 stock growth, which again causes the t = 2 implementable
harvest set to rotate counterclockwise.
Figure 5d considers the SP-CA stock scenario {1.2x∗, 0.8x∗, 0.8x∗, 1.2x∗} and quota {2Q∗, Q∗}.
This scenario is chosen to illustrate conditions under which discarding occurs. Specifically,
when species 2 quota is particularly small, its targeting costs rise. Costs can then be lowered
by targeting a mix of species that aligns with their relative abundance and discarding the
overage.
Figure 5d shows equilibrium harvests across regions and subperiods; points A and B denote
regional harvests at t = 1, and C and D represent regional harvests at t = 2. Landings are
represented with their small case counterparts. In each region and in each subperiod, harvests
of species 2 fish exceeds landings, i.e., d2st > 0. Note also that with positive discards the
species 2 seasonal quota lease price satisfies λ2 = p2. Finally, and as above, we also see that
intra-regional stock differences diminish over time and both species stocks evolve toward their
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Figure 6: Temporal Price Effects. Panel (a) assumes abundance scenario SP-HOM
and quota {1.6Q∗, 1.6Q∗}. Panel (b) assumes abundance scenario SP-HOM and quota
{2Q∗, 1.2Q∗}. In both cases, landings prices are 20% below and 20% above baseline values
in subperiod t = 1 and t = 2, respectively.
steady state values.
Price variation
We next consider the effects of exogenously varying market conditions on equilibrium outcomes.
We specifically focus on the variation of landings prices within a fishing season. One might
conjecture that equilibrium harvest behavior will induce higher harvests in periods with higher
fish prices and vice versa. What is less obvious is how the temporal distribution of harvests
interacts with season stock growth to determine the seasonal harvest and landings profile.
Suppose, for example, that landings prices are higher in subperiod 1. This price dynamic
will induce higher harvests early and lower harvests later in the fishing season. A lower escape-
ment in the first subperiod in turn reduces stocks available in later subperiods thus further
reducing late-season harvests. Figure 6 shows these effects formally.
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Assume stocks are symmetric across a regions at {x∗, x∗, x∗, x∗}. Figure 6a displays the
seasonal equilibrium when the quotas are set symmetrically at {1.6Q∗, 1.6Q∗} but with landings
prices for both species 20% below the baseline at t = 1, and 20% above the baseline at t = 2.
The expansion of the implementable sets in figure 6a highlights the amplified stock growth
effects. A lower price at t − 1 not only induces lower harvest and quota utilization, but by
increasing stocks size at t = 2 further tilts harvests and quota utilization toward subperiod 2.
Sufficiently large variation in the price of fish within a season can induce discards during
subperiods of low prices. Recall that a discard requires λi = pit. Suppose discards occur in a
subperiod with pit = p
L
i = λi. In another subperiod with pit = p
H
i > p
L
i = λi, discards fall to
zero. Figure 6b illustrates this scenario for an ecologically homogenous fishery, i.e., symmetric
initial stocks at {x∗, x∗, x∗, x∗}. We assume quotas at {2Q∗, 1.2Q∗}. Finally, we let p1 remain
constant at its baseline value over the entire season, and assume p2 varies from 20% below to
20% above its benchmark in subperiods t = 1 and t = 2, respectively.
In contrast to figure 6a, a relatively lower price for species 2 fish tilts the t = 1 imple-
mentable set towards species 1. The harvest of both species, 1 and 2, is lower relative to
harvests at t = 2. Since the quota of species 2 is relatively small, it is optimal for fishermen
to wait until t = 2 to bring species 2 harvest to the docks. At t = 1, much of the harvest
of species 2 is discarded. This harvest overage occurs in order to avoid harvesting costs that
would otherwise incur if a lower harvest of species 2 were targeted.
3.3 Comparative analysis
This section studies the effects of key model parameters on equilibrium outcomes. We continue
with the benchmark stock growth, dockside prices, and harvest technology (table 1). We
assume the fishery is initially in steady state with stock abundance and quota set to their long
run rent-maximizing levels.
Our first experiment varies the intrinsic growth rates of both species stocks in region 1.
The purpose is to examine spatial-temporal implications of an asymmetric ecological shock.
An example, may be a pollution event that alters the quality of the marine habitat, or perhaps
climate change that impacts nutrient availability in a region of the fishery.
A second experiment studies the spatial-temporal implications of shock to the cost of
capital, e.g., a government program that subsidizes capital investments (Sumaila, et al., 2010).
The first two experiments assume that the two fish species have identical characteristics
within a region. In the third experiment, regions are assumed heterogeneous with different
species-specific relative abundance. We then let the price of one species vary across time. This
variation impacts the two regions asymmetrically because of their differences in relative stock
abundance. As a result, the equilibrium outcomes vary across all three dimensions: species,
regions, and time.
Regional stock growth
We let the growth rate of both species in region 1, as reflected by parameters r11 and r21, to
vary from 50% below to 50% above the benchmark value of 1. All other parameters remain as
reported in table 1. Figure 7a displays changes in capital deployment and harvests in subperiod
1 as regional stock growth varies along the horizontal axes, ∆r1. Figure 7b displays changes
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Figure 7: Regional Stock Growth: Capital and Harvest Effects. Units are reported as
percentage change from benchmark model steady state values. Panel (a) results (subperiod 1)
are common across regions. In panel (b), solid lines denote region 1 and dashed lines denote
region 2.
in capital and harvests in subperiod 2. The solid lines in the figure show changes in region 1
and the dashed lines in regions 2. There are no regional differences in capital and harvests in
subperiod 1 and therefore no dashed lines appear in figure 7a.
Consider positive growth shocks in region 1, ∆r1 > 0. Higher stock growth in region 1
implies higher abundance in region 1 in subperiod t = 2 relative to the benchmark case. It is
therefore less costly and more efficient to utilize quota in region 1 at t = 2. Figure 7b confirms
that in subperiod t = 2 both capital and harvest are increase in region 1 and fall in region 2.
What is striking is that, despite higher growth in region 1, both regions respond identically
at subperiod t = 1. Both regions have identical stock conditions at t = 1, identical dockside
prices, and identical quota prices. A competitive equilibrium therefore attracts identical capital
which implies identical harvest across the two regions. That is, the quota that is reallocated
from subperiod 1 to subperiod 2 is drawn from regions 1 and 2 equally.23
Figure 8 shows how equilibrium quota prices change as region 1 becomes more productive.
Recall that a single species-specific quota price prevails in equilibrium irrespective of where
the growth occurs. Intuitively, if the fishery is more productive (∆r1 > 0), the unit quota rent
become larger reflecting cost saving and thus profitability with increased stock abundance.
Capital costs
In the benchmark case the cost of capital, ρ, is assumed common across regions and subperiods.
To examine inter-temporal capital price effects, we now let ρ in region 1 drop/rise by x% of its
benchmark value in subperiod 1 and then rise/drop by an equal amount in subperiod 2. The
capital price in region 2 is assumed to remain constant at its benchmark value. To focus on
spatial-temporal economic effects, the two fish species are assumed to have identical growth
characteristics. Since stocks and initial quotas are otherwise symmetric, the results presented
23In contrast, a sole owner may leave a higher escapement in the region with higher growth rate to exploit the
subsequent cost advantage of a higher stock. It is precisely because a sole-owner internalizes the stock dynamics,
which an ITQ equilibrium does not.
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Figure 8: Regional Stock Growth and Equilibrium Quota Prices. Units are reported
as percentage changes relative to benchmark model steady state values.
below are common to both species.
Figures 9a and 9b show how equilibrium capital allocations change in region 1 and region
2, respectively, under seasonal and regional capital price shocks. Note that negative values on
the horizontal axes in both figures signify a capital price decrease in subperiod 1 followed by
a price increase (of the same % magnitude) in subperiod 2.
Consider first a rise in ρ1 at t = 1 (accompanied with an offsetting fall at t = 2). We see
that N is lower than the benchmark value at t = 1 in region 1. A lower harvest in region 1
implies higher stock abundance at t = 2, which combined with a lower cost of capital leads to a
bumper rise in the capital deployment in this region at t = 2. The variation in the capital price
does not much impact the capital deployment and harvest activity in region 2 however (effects
are in the range of 0%-2%). At t = 1, region 2 has a relatively low cost of capital and continues
to attract capital close to the benchmark quantity. At t = 2, a sufficiently high activity in
region 1 also creates accompanying stock growth effects. As a result, region 2 continues to
attract about the same amount of capital as in the benchmark case.
Figure 9c displays the fishery wide and regional quota utilization at t = 1, with the remain-
ing quota being utilized at t = 2. There is not much action in region 1. Its utilization remains
close to the benchmark. Though not presented above, it is found that region 2’s harvest and
quota utilization at t = 2 is also close to benchmark values. Thus, the main impact of harvest
activity occurs in region 1. When panels (a) and (c) of figure 9 are inspected together, it be-
comes clear that the aggregate harvest response is more muted in region 1 than is the capital
response. Thus, at t = 1, a fewer units of capital harvest a larger amount of fish than under
the benchmark, whereas at t = 2, more capital harvests less than under the benchmark.
Finally, figure 9d shows changes in the equilibrium quota prices. Despite temporal changes
of 15% in ρ1, the quota price does not vary beyond 1% of its benchmark value. The capital
adjustments in region 1 are consistent with small change in the fishery rent. Whether ρ1 rises in
the first period and falls in the second, or vice versa does not change the direction of response
of the quota price. When ρ1 rises at t = 1, region 1 is more cost efficient at t = 2 with a
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Figure 9: Regional-Temporal Capital Costs. Units are reported as percentage changes
relative to the benchmark model steady state values with price increases (declines) in subperiod
1 matching declines (increases) in subperiod 2.
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Figure 10: Landings Prices Under Regional and Species-Specific Stock Asymmetry.
Results are reported as percentage change relative to the benchmark model steady state values.
Price increases (declines) in subperiod 1 match declines (increases) in subperiod 2.
lower ρ1 and higher stocks. This raises the quota price. When ρ1 falls at t = 1, much harvest
activity takes place in region 1 at t = 1. A lower escapement however endogenously entails a
higher growth rate. The overall impact again is an increase in the quota price.
Price changes in a heterogeneous fishery
We now deviate somewhat from the above experiments and consider a fishery with regional
and species-specific differences in habitat quality. We let region 1 have a higher carrying
capacity for species 1, while region 2 has an identical advantage for species 2. In this modified
benchmark steady state the relative stock abundance X11X21 =
X22
X11
= 1.4.
To examine region-specific, intertemporal price effects, we let the price of species 1 fall
(rise) by x% in subperiod 1 and then rise (fall) by an equal amount in subperiod 2. The price
change we consider is ±15%.
We note first that the law of one price continues to hold, i.e., the landings price for either
species does not vary regionally. Figure 10a shows how within-season price variation for species
1 impacts aggregate harvest and quota utilization of the two species at t = 1 (quota utilization
at t = 2 is its reflection over the horizontal axis). Figure 10b shows percent changes in vessel
capital deployment across regions and subperiods relative to the benchmark case.
Notice that negative values on the horizontal axis for ∆p1 signify that the price of species
1 is lower in the first subperiod by the value indicated on the horizontal axis; the price is
higher than the benchmark value by the same percentage amount in the second subperiod.
The opposite is the case when this value is positive.
Figure 10b shows that a rise (fall) in the price of species 1 in the first subperiod leads
to a rise (fall) in capital deployment; accompanying changes in aggregate harvest and quota
utilization are shown in figure 10a. A lower price of species 1 in the first period induces
fishermen to wait until the subperiod 2, not only for the higher harvest of species 1, but also
for the harvest of species 2 in order to take advantage of the cost complementarities under the
joint harvest technology.
The response of the equilibrium quota price is somewhat complicated. Figure 11 shows that
a first subperiod drop in the species 1 price increases the equilibrium quota price for species
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Figure 11: Price Shock Effects: equilibrium quota prices. Results are reported as per-
centage change relative to the benchmark model steady state values. Price increases (declines)
in subperiod 1 match declines (increases) in subperiod 2.
1 (which remains constant throughout the season) and causes a decline in the species 2 quota
price, although the effect is relatively minor.
To understand this result, first recall that average seasonal landings prices are constant in
the scenario under consideration. In the first period, stocks are identical to the benchmark
case and thus harvest costs are the same as under the benchmark. However, a lower landing
price and thus harvest in subperiod 1 implies higher abundance in subperiod 2 and therefore
a stock-effect cost savings in the second subperiod. This stock effect lowers average seasonal
costs and increases unit quota value.
4 Conclusion
This paper derives a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium in a complex ecological and
economic environment under a tradable quota regulation. Our model features a general rep-
resentation of a multiple species ecology and a joint harvesting technology. We characterize a
rational equilibrium mapping from initial spatial stock conditions and economic fundamentals
to spatial-temporal harvests, landings, and discards by species, quota prices, capital alloca-
tions, revenues under a tradable quota regulation. The results demonstrate complex interac-
tions between multiple ecological and economic forces that are operational in a quota-managed
fishery.
While we focus on a two-species, two-region and two-subperiod case of our model, the
conditions for a recursive equilibrium extend to multiple species, regions and subperiods. Our
numerical algorithm can also be applied to higher dimension problems although as is well
understood, computational time increases exponentially as species, regions and seasonal sub-
periods increase.
Equilibrium capital allocations satisfy a condition that equates capital rent to its opportu-
nity cost, and quota utilization in which unit rent is constant across space and time within a
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fishing season. These principles combine with the growth and spatial dispersion patterns of fish
stocks to determine rational equilibrium outcomes of interest to managers and stakeholders.
An important theme present in the model and results is that ecological and economic out-
comes are determined concurrently. The implication is that marine ecosystems that support
commercial fisheries are simultaneously influenced by ecological and anthropogenic (economic
and regulatory) forces and should be managed as such.
We derive a mapping from initial ecological-economic conditions to equilibrium harvests,
landings, discards, capital allocation and rent outcomes under varying quotas. Without full
understanding of this mapping, well intentioned regulations will fail to meet management
goals: in the jargon of the EBFM literature, regulations will be vulnerable to implementation
uncertainty. Our results indicate that without foresight of the range of ecological-economic
consequences, setting multiple-species quotas that meet long term management goals, e.g.,
stock conservation and generation of rent, may be impossible. Our model predicts ecological-
economic equilibrium outcomes ex ante, and therefore offers an approach for reducing imple-
mentation uncertainty and a path forward for improving management strategy evaluation in
complex marine environments and under regulations that are operational in real world fisheries.
This paper has assumed that commercial fishermen are forward looking, fully rational
agents that address private profit maximizing objectives within a complex ecological, economic,
and regulatory environment. The rationality assumption invites some skepticism and empirical
validation. On the other hand, evaluative tools that ignore the disciplining forces present in
individual transferable quota markets, and/or rely on ad hoc behavioral rules lack internal
validity. Our application of recursive, fully rational equilibrium methodology under realistic
regulatory instrument is an important advance to implementing ecosystem-based management
of marine ecosystems.
An understanding of the equilibrium mapping from regulations to seasonal profits and post-
season stocks is the first and the necessary step towards a long-term optimal management
of an ITQ regulated fishery. A long-term optimal quota management requires finding the
optimal quota policy function that responds to the current state of the fishery. This includes
both exogenous states, e.g., processes for fish market prices, input and capital prices, and
endogenous states, i.e., spatial-species-specific stock abundance and their laws of motions, in
turn, as functions of current exogenous and endogenous states. The optimal policy function
maximizes the fishery value function that maps current fishery state to its present discounted
dollar value. Exploring these policy functions for alternative fishery environments is our goal
for future research.
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6 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Write the variable cost function as
c (h, φ (X,H)) =
1 +∑
j
γj
(
hj∑
k hk
− Xj∑
kXk
)2∑
k
φk (Xk, Hk)h
ν
k,
where j, k is the species’ index. Taking its derivative with respect to hi and then multiplying
by the same hi gets
chihi = ν
1 +∑
j
γj
(
hj∑
k hk
− Xj∑
kXk
)2φihνi
+2γi
(
hi∑
k hk
− Xi∑
kXk
)∑
j 6=i
hj
hi∑k φk (Xk, Hk)hνk
(
∑
k hk)
2
−2hi
∑
j 6=i
γj
(
hj∑
k hk
− Xj∑
kXk
)
hj
∑
k φ
i (Xk, Hk)h
ν
k
(
∑
k hk)
2 .
The last two terms equal
∑
k φ
i(Xk,N,Hk)h
ν
k
(
∑
k hk)
2 times
Λi ≡ 2γi
(
hi∑
k hk
− Xi∑
kXk
)∑
j 6=i
hj
hi − 2hi∑
j 6=i
γj
(
hj∑
k hk
− Xj∑
kXk
)
hj
= 2hiγi
(
hi∑
k hk
− Xi∑
kXk
)∑
j
hj
− 2hi∑
j
γjhj
(
hj∑
k hk
− Xj∑
kXk
)
.
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Note that
∑
ι
Λi = 2
∑
j
hj
∑
i
hiγi
(
hi∑
k hk
− Xi∑
kXk
)
−2
(∑
i
hi
)∑
j
γjhj
(
hj∑
k hk
− Xj∑
kXk
)
= 0.
Therefore,
∑
ι
chihi = ν
1 +∑
j
γj
(
hj∑
k hk
− Xj∑
kXk
)2∑
ι
φihνi
+
∑
k φ
i (Xk, Hk)h
ν
k
(
∑
k hk)
2
∑
ι
Λi
= νc (h, φ (X,H)) .
Suppose, instead, that the cost function takes the following form:
c (h, φ (X,H)) =
∑
j
(
1 + γj
(
hj∑
k hk
− Xj∑
kXk
)2)
φj (Xj , Hj)h
ν
j
In this case,
chihi = ν
(
1 + γi
(
hi∑
k hk
− Xi∑
kXk
)2)
φihνi
+2γi
(
hi∑
k hk
− Xi∑
kXk
)
hi
(
∑
k hk)
2
∑
j 6=i
hj
φihνi
−2hi
∑
j 6=i
γj
(
hj∑
k hk
− Xj∑
kXk
)
hj
(
∑
k hk)
2φ
jhνj .
The last two terms equal 1
(
∑
k hk)
2 times
Ξi ≡ 2
∑
j
hj
(γihi( hi∑
k hk
− Xi∑
kXk
)
φihνi
)
−2hi
∑
j
γjhj
(
hj∑
k hk
− Xj∑
kXk
)
hjφ
jhνj .
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Once again,
∑
ι
Ξi = 2
∑
j
hj
∑
i
γihi
(
hi∑
k hk
− Xi∑
kXk
)
−2
(∑
i
hi
)∑
j
γjhj
(
hj∑
k hk
− Xj∑
kXk
)
= 0,
which, once again, implies ∑
ι
chihi = νc (h, φ (X,H)) .
7 Appendix: Computational Algorithm
The equilibrium allocations for T ≥ 2 are obtained numerically by following the steps enumer-
ated below. We continue to focus on a fishery with two regions 1 and 2.
1. Fix X ≡ {X11, X21, X12, X22} . Given X, generate regional and aggregate implementable
partitions by following the steps discussed in section 3.1.
2. Given these implementability partitions, compute
{N ≡ {N 1, N2} , H ≡ {H11, H21, H12, H22} , {λ1, λ2}}
for all possible Q ≡ {Q1, Q2}.
3. Repeat step 2 over a plausible domain for X. These computations also obtain the mul-
tiplier values for λi (X,Q) ∈ [0, pi].
4. Now consider subperiod T − 1 and T . The optimal solution to the static problem in
any period given {X,Q} has already been solved. Let {X,Q} be the state in subperiod
T − 1. But now the optimal choice problem entails only a part of Q to be utilized and
the remaining to be carried forward to T. Let Q′ be carried over to T . Then optimal
static choice problem in T − 1 gets λi (X,Q−Q′) and {N,H} for T − 1 as functions
of {X,Q−Q′}. In Equilibrium X ′ = Γ (X −H). Then in T , λi (Γ (X −H) , Q′). The
equilibrium requires that
λi
(
X,Q−Q′) = λi (Γ (X −H (X,Q)) , Q′)
Solving this fixed point problem recursively obtains season’s optimal quota utilization
over multiple subperiods.
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